Standard of Review Administrative Law Decision

Our scope of review of an administrative agency’s final determination is limited. In re Herrmann, 192 N.J. 19, 27 (2007). A “strong presumption of reasonableness attaches” to the agency’s decision. In re Carroll, 339 N.J. Super. 429, 437 (App. Div. 2001) (quoting In re Vey, 272 N.J. Super. 199, 205 (App. Div. 1993), aff’d, 135 N.J. 306 (1994)). The burden is upon the appellant to demonstrate grounds for reversal. McGowan v. N.J. State Parole Bd., 347 N.J. Super. 544, 563 (App. Div. 2002); see also Bowden v. Bayside State Prison, 268 N.J. Super. 301, 304 (App. Div. 1993) (stating that “[t]he burden of showing the agency’s action was arbitrary, unreasonable[,] or capricious rests upon the appellant”). To that end, we will “not disturb an administrative agency’s determinations or findings unless there is a clear showing that (1) the agency did not follow the law; (2) the decision was arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable; or (3) the decision was not supported by substantial evidence.” In re Virtua-West Jersey Hosp. Voorhees for a Certificate of Need, 194 N.J. 413, 422 (2008).

“[A]ppellate review of an agency’s choice of sanction is [likewise] limited.” In re License Issued to Zahl, 186 N.J. 341, 353 (2006). Thus, we “will modify a sanction ‘only when necessary to bring the agency’s action into conformity with its delegated authority.'” Ibid. (quoting In re Polk License Revocation, 90 N.J. 550, 578 (1982)). “[T]he test in reviewing administrative sanctions is ‘whether such punishment is so disproportionate to the offense, in light of all the circumstances, as to be shocking to one’s sense of fairness.'” Polk, 90 N.J. at 578 (quoting Pell v. Bd. of Educ., 34 N.Y.2d 222, 233 (1974)).