Appellate Division’s Standard of review of the Administrative Law Judge’s ruling.

Submitted by professional license defense lawyer, Jeffrey Hark.

We recognize our “‘limited role’ in the review of [Commission] decisions.” In re Stallworth, 208 N.J. 182, 194 (2011) (quoting Henry v. Rahway State Prison, 81 N.J. 571, 579 (1980)). “An appellate court affords a ‘strong presumption of reasonableness’ to an administrativeagency’s exercise of its statutorily delegated responsibilities.” Lavezzi v. State, 219 N.J. 163, 171 (2014) (quoting City of Newark v. Nat. Res. Council, Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 82 N.J. 530, 539 (1980)). “In order to reverse an agency’s judgment, an appellate court must find the agency’s decision to be ‘arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable, or . . . not supported by substantial credible evidence in the record as a whole.'” Stallworth, 208 N.J. at 194 (quoting Henry, 81 N.J. at 579-80) (alteration in original)). [Matter of Restrepo, Dept. of Corrections, 449 N.J. Super. 409, 417 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 230 N.J. 574 (2017). As a general rule, the reviewing court should give “due the opportunity of the one who heard the witnesses to judge of their credibility . . . and . . . [give] due regard also to the agency’s expertise where such expertise is a pertinent factor.” Clowes v. Terminix Int’l, Inc., 109 N.J. 575, 587 (1988) (alterations in original) (quoting Close v. Kordulak Bros., 44 N.J. 589, 599 (1965)). Adhering to that limited review standard, we conclude the ALJ’s findings were well-supported by the record, and that her decision was not arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable.