Revised 12/3/01
Count of this indictment charges the defendant with aggravated assault.
The defendant is accused of violating a law that provides in pertinent part:
A person is guilty of aggravated assault if (he/she) . . . (a)ttempts by physical menace to put . . . (a)ny law enforcement officer acting in the performance of (his/her) duties while in uniform or exhibiting evidence of (his/her) authority or because of (his/her) status as a law enforcement officer . . . in fear of imminent serious bodily injury.
For you to find the defendant guilty of this offense, the State must prove each of the following elements beyond a reasonable doubt:
1. that the defendant purposely attempted by physical menace to put (insert name of victim) in fear of imminent serious bodily injury;
2. that (insert name of victim) was a law-enforcement officer; and
3a. that the defendant knew that (insert name of victim) was a law-enforcement officer [2] acting in the performance of (his/her) duties or while in uniform or exhibiting evidence of (his/her) authority;[3] or
4b. that the defendant knew that (insert name of victim) was a law-enforcement officer [4] and purposely committed the act against (him/her) because of (his/her) status as a law-enforcement officer.
The first element that the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt is that the defendant purposely attempted by physical menace to put (insert name of victim) in fear of imminent serious bodily injury.
Physical menace means a threatening of harm by physical conduct, and not merely by words.
Purpose is a condition of the mind that cannot be seen and that can often be determined only from inferences from conduct, words or acts. It is not necessary for the State to produce a witness to testify that the defendant stated that (he/she) acted with a particular state of mind. It is within your power to find that proof of purpose has been furnished beyond a reasonable doubt by inferences that may arise from the nature of the acts and circumstances surrounding the conduct in question.
The second element that the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt is that (insert name of victim) was a law-enforcement officer.
The third element that the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt is:
a. that the defendant knew that (insert name of victim) was a law-enforcement officer acting in the performance of (his/her) duties or while in uniform or exhibiting evidence of (his/her) authority; or
b. that the defendant knew that (insert name of victim) was a law-enforcement officer and purposely committed the act against (him/her) because of (his/her) status as a law-enforcement officer.
I have already instructed you on the meaning of a purposeful state of mind. That definition also applies to this element.
Like purpose, knowledge is a condition of the mind that cannot be seen and that can often be determined only from inferences from conduct, words or acts.
If you find that the State has proven every element beyond a reasonable doubt, then you must find the defendant guilty. If, however, the State has failed to prove any element beyond a reasonable doubt, then you must find (him/her) not guilty.
[1] This charge is drafted for the most common situation, where a defendant is charged with aggravated assault upon a law enforcement officer under N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1b(5)(a). Other sections of the statute apply, with differing language, to aggravated assault upon paid and volunteer firemen; emergency first-aid and medical personnel; school board members, school administrators, teachers and other employees of a school board; employees of the Division of Youth and Family Services; the judiciary; and bus drivers and railroad employees. N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1b(5)(b) to (g). As always, the Model Charge must be adapted to fit the facts of each case.
[2] State v. Green, 318 N.J. Super. 361, 376 (App. Div. 1999), aff’d o.b., 163 N.J. 140 (2000) (the defendant must know that the victim is a law-enforcement officer).
[3] If transferred intent is an issue, the charge should be modified accordingly. State in the Interest of S.B., 333 N.J. Super. 236, 243 (App. Div. 2000).
[4] State v. Green, supra.
[5] N.J.S.A. 2C:11-1b.
[6] Cf. the Model Charge for terroristic threats (N.J.S.A. 2C:12-3b).
[7] N.J.S.A. 2C:2-2b(1).
[8] N.J.S.A. 40A:14-152.2.
[9] N.J.S.A. 2C:2-2b(2)
[10] N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1a.